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1.   Introduction
A big determinant of the shape of cit-
ies is the role and direction of transport 
planning. The different approaches and 
outcomes of this discipline can be clearly 
seen in a simple comparison of the conti-
nental European cities with the American 
and Australian cities. While these Europe-
an cities retain a balance between private 
and public transport and non-motorised 
modes and city centres are mostly intact 
with extensive pedestrianisation schemes, 
American and Australian cities are domi-
nated by automobile transport and their 
centres are frequently hostile places, be-
ing in some cases almost two-thirds roads 
and parking space.
The reasons for these differences are ob-
viously complex, including historical and 
cultural factors, but transport planning 
practices have played an important role 
too. In this paper an historical insight 
is provided into how transport planning 
methods and practices, based on what has 
been derogatorily termed a “predict and 
provide” computer modelling approach 
(which treats traffic as a liquid), have 
helped to evolve the automobile-depend-
ent city.  This is followed by an explanation 
of the way technical and computer model-
based approaches to transport historically 
have fallen far short in providing the policy 
direction and vision required in develop-
ing well-functioning transport systems in 
cities. 
In many cases these traditional model-
ling shortcomings endure until today. For 
example, the recent UK pronouncements 
about the expectation of significant new 
traffic growth over the coming decades 
(Local Transport Today 592, March 16-29), 
the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route 
(http://www.awpr.co.uk/(accessed April 
5, 2012,) and the Lancaster Northern By-
pass, to name just a few current issues 
in the UK alone, have all the hallmarks of 
this now widely discredited predict and 
provide approach. More extensively, the 
emerging economies have tended to un-
critically import these post-World War 2 
traffic modelling approaches. Partly as a 
consequence of the conceptual framing 
of transport problems inherent in these 
models, focussing almost entirely on the 
impossible dream of congestion removal, 
many are building freeways at an alarming 
rate (e.g. in India and China).
Counter to this rather negative story, 
there is now clear evidence that other ap-
proaches are possible, which yield very dif-
ferent results for cities (Goodwin, 1997). 
A fundamental underpinning of the way 
that land use-transport models operate 
is to treat traffic analogously to a liquid, 
something that retains its original volume 
regardless of the container into which it 
is placed, in this case the capacity of the 
road infrastructure which accommodates 
it. This conceptual treatment makes traf-
fic tantamount to immutable. However, 
extensive evidence is now available that 
traffic is by no means a fixed given, but 
rather behaves more like a gas, expanding 
to fill the space available and compressing 
to cope with reduced road capacity (e.g. 
http://articles.latimes.com/1997-05-14/
local/me-58478_1_freeways-capacity-
traffic (accessed April 5, 2012); Siegel, 
2007). 
There is also evidence now about “peak 
car use” which undermines the whole his-
torical trajectory of never ending traffic 
increases and road building cycles that 
traditional transport planning has facili-
tated (Newman and Kenworthy, 2011; Mil-
lard-Ball and Schipper, 2010; Puentes and 
Tomer, 2009). This paper will attempt to 
summarise the evidence on these matters, 
thus pointing the way to a more produc-
tive approach to transport planning than 
blind acceptance of the output of traffic 
models using too simplistic assumptions 
as the basis of their projections and pre-
scriptions. This new approach might be 
termed “Debate and Decide”, which inher-
ently treats traffic as a gas whose volume 
is thus compressible given reductions in 
road capacity.
Transport models are useful inventions if 
used in a strategic and controlled way. So, 
rather than ‘throwing the baby out with 
the bath water’, some suggestions are also 
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made in this paper about how the tech-
nical procedures might be better used to 
provide solutions to growing motorisation 
in cities and result in more sustainable 
transport in cities.
2.  The origins and philosophy of com-
puter-based transport planning
Perhaps the most important and influen-
tial of the technical procedures in trans-
port planning is the land use-transport 
modelling process, which emerged in the 
mid 1950’s as a distinct area of study.  The 
watershed for land use-transport model-
ling was the publication in 1954 of Mitchell 
and Rapkins’ “Urban traffic - A function of 
land use” which first drew systematic at-
tention to the fact that traffic arises out of 
land use (Brown et al, 1972). The implica-
tion of this book was therefore that the fu-
ture of transport in any city is inextricably 
linked to whether the city is evolving with 
compact, mixed land uses which support 
public transport, walking and cycling or 
sprawling in car-dependent patterns that 
ensure the car is needed typically for more 
than 80% of daily trips. 
The immediate post-war period, as will be 
discussed in more detail below, was a time 
of huge economic optimism and growth 
when the car was seen as the future of 
urban transport. The conceptual break-
through provided by Mitchell and Rapkin, 
accompanied by the rapid evolution of 
computing power, led to a meteor show-
er of multi-million dollar transport stud-
ies in North America, Australia, Europe 
and many other countries. The purpose of 
these studies was to plan for anticipated 
growth in population, jobs and traffic flows 
as far ahead as 20 to 30 years such that 
there would continually be an equilibrium 
between the supply of transport facilities 
and demand for travel as it arises out of 
land use. As will be shown, this is very 
similar to the calls in 2012 from the DfT in 
the UK, which see vehicle miles of travel 
in England growing by up to 55% over the 
next 25 years (see later).
  
The concept of the “grand transportation 
study” was embraced with enormous en-
thusiasm with virtually every developed 
city at some point between about 1955 
and 1975 undertaking at least one ma-
jor transportation study.  In the US since 
1962, urban areas over 50,000 people 
have been required to do land use-trans-
port studies on a regular basis to quali-
fy for Federal road funds. These studies 
were widely acknowledged as being una-
shamedly highway-oriented (Brown et 
al, 1972).  Governments vigorously pro-
moted them partly because they were a 
high profile vote-winning exercise which 
appeared to be tackling transport issues 
and partly because of the political influ-
ence brought to bare on Governments by 
the road lobby and a handful of interna-
tional transport consulting firms with close 
links inside transport bureaucracies the 
world over, who very quickly adopted, and 
to some extent monopolised, the then es-
oteric technical procedures. There was a 
huge amount of money to be made from 
“grand transportation plans” during the 
1950’s through to the 1970’s, and trans-
port consulting firms were only too eager 
to adapt their technical expertise to fit the 
political expectations of the time (witness 
studies with names like SATS – Sydney 
Area Transport Study; CATS – Chicago 
Area Transport Study; MATS – Melbourne 
Area Transport Study, ad nauseum).
Part of the prevailing philosophy during 
this period was that transport planning 
was largely seen as a value free, objective 
science carried out by equally objective 
traffic experts, mostly males. Traffic was 
viewed as an independent and unavoid-
able, indeed immutable, physical phenom-
enon and there were few questions raised 
about the validity or even the desirability 
of attempting to cater for all projected 
growth. Technical manuals and standards 
for road design to cope with growing traf-
fic were developed apace and the work of 
transport planning was left mostly in the 
hands of single discipline technical ana-
lysts.   
The fact was, however, that these highly 
technical and expensive studies were not 
scientific nor value free, but were strong-
ly influenced by their social setting. The 
1950’s and early 1960’s were a very op-
timistic, certain and prosperous period 
characterised by growth and consumption 
orientated lifestyles. Car ownership was 
booming and the political expectation, at 
least in the US and Australia, and for a 
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time in Europe, was that the automobile 
would be the future of urban transport. 
Planning was based on a standard of one or 
two cars per family. Priority was therefore 
given to automobiles and road construc-
tion, while the pillars of transport planning 
became mobility and speed. Accessibility 
largely took a back seat to mobility, mean-
ing in simple terms that a 200 metre walk 
at 5 km/h to a corner shop for a litre of 
milk became a 5 km drive at 50 km/h to 
a ‘big box’ shopping centre. The approach 
was to “construct away” any problems of 
the car, especially the traffic queues and 
increasing number of traffic accidents and 
deaths through better road systems (Gun-
narsson and Leleur, 1989).  
Thus right from the outset land use-trans-
port studies tended to be strongly asso-
ciated with planning for roads and cars 
rather than a balance of transport modes, 
and most of the US and Australian land 
use-transport studies pioneered the build-
ing of elaborate highway and freeway sys-
tems (Brown et al, 1972).
  
The first major transportation plans to ap-
pear were the Chicago and Detroit Area 
Transportation Studies, which were very 
much along the lines just described. 
These two studies pioneered the techni-
cal procedures we know today as the land 
use-transport modelling process (Black, 
1981). These technical procedures have 
been refined and tuned over the years but 
have evolved into what is generally known 
as the “conventional” land use-transporta-
tion planning study. It has in fact been said 
that there is “a generalised international 
urban transportation planning process” or 
UTP (Ben Bouanah and Stein, 1978).
This process can be characterised by the 
following major tasks (see Black, 1981): 
(1) Formation of goals and objectives; 
(2) Inventories of the present situation 
(mainly Household Travel Surveys (HTS) 
to determine a population’s trip making 
frequency, purposes, modes and other 
characteristics), which are then used to 
undertake the four key mathematical 
steps - trip generation, trip distribution, 
modal split and traffic assignment (hence 
the other commonly used term: 4-Step 
Gravity Models); 
(3) Forecasting of new land use plans and 
their resulting traffic, modelled on the 
baseline set of data developed under the 
previous step; 
(4) Analysis of alternative transport net-
works to cope with predicted travel and; 
(5) Evaluation of various alternatives ac-
cording to costs, benefits, impacts and 
practicality, followed by recommendations. 
These tasks, however, are by no means 
value-free, objective technical procedures 
and there are numerous ways that they 
can be biased to facilitate certain direc-
tions. The transportation studies of this 
early era pioneered large-scale road and 
highway planning and in the process public 
transport, especially rail, was glossed over 
and effectively eliminated from considera-
tion in many cities, (e.g. Denver, Detroit, 
Phoenix, Houston and most other US cit-
ies).  Stopher and Meyburg (1975) show 
this clearly when they comment about how 
public transport was dealt with technically 
in the modal split stage of the US studies:
“The earlier in the process that transit 
trips could be estimated and removed 
from further consideration, the more effi-
cient would be the resulting highway trav-
el forecasting procedure.” 
The analysis would then proceed with most 
forecasting based on private transport 
growth and land use patterns to match. 
Once such low density land use is in place 
public transport is more often than not 
based on an inefficient and infrequent bus 
service (often merely demand responsive 
buses in very low density areas), walking 
is reduced to taking the dog around the 
block, and bikes are hardly used at all, 
even by children. Car usage proliferates 
and a massive increase in road funding is 
then needed to provide the highway ca-
pacity for the “grand plan” needs and to 
keep the system from perceived collapse.
There are other ways that the large-scale 
transportation studies using 4-Step traffic 
models have played an important role in 
facilitating automobile dependence in cit-
ies (Newman and Kenworthy, 1984). For 
example, the modelling process does not 
address walking and bicycling in any mean-
ingful way due to the fact that the models 
are set up with a set of Origin-Destination 
Zones (O-D zones) and are designed to 
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measure trips from one zone to another. 
Shorter intra-zonal trips, which are pos-
sible by foot and bicycle, are hardly dealt 
with, but are placed in a kind of ‘throw 
away’ category called “centroid connec-
tors” and not modelled effectively. In ad-
dition, the smaller scale effects of local 
density increases or mixed land use within 
an O-D zone are not brought out in the 
model results. The density of population 
and jobs within each zone is an average 
and therefore considered to be uniformly 
distributed. The distribution of that densi-
ty within a zone is therefore not modelled 
properly or reflected in policy conclusions 
(e.g. high density, mixed use TODs around 
rail stations, which can greatly alter over-
all travel patterns).
The shortcomings of these traditional 
4-step models are dealt with in a compre-
hensive way by Atkins (1986) through a 
detailed review of over fifty critical studies. 
Atkins shows clearly how in every respect, 
at least up until that time, there were ma-
jor deficiencies and flaws in conventional 
transport modelling studies. These prob-
lems cover the models’ performance and 
accuracy, structural deficiencies or speci-
fication errors in the models and a mis-
match between the capabilities of the 
models and the purposes for which they 
are used. Most importantly, this last as-
pect shows how they are not good pre-
dictive tools, and are of little use in ex-
amining genuine policy options designed 
to effect change in cities. The specification 
errors are inherent in the data collection 
process, the development of the zones 
and networks, the trip generation predic-
tions, the trip distribution, modal split and 
traffic assignment stages, calibration and 
validation and finally in forecasting ability.
Such problems can still be found today in 
terms of the way problems are framed and 
the solutions offered. This is because most 
models are still premised more on a sup-
ply-side approach of greater road infra-
structure to solve circulation problems and 
other perceived transport inadequacies in 
cities, rather than on an approach which, 
for example, asks ‘how do we change the 
existing dependence on cars by providing 
more sustainable and cost-effective alter-
natives?’ 
One of the papers reviewed by Atkins 
sums up the experience with traditional 
transport modelling in the following rather 
damning way:
  “It might be said (with due apologies) 
of computer-based transportation model-
ling that ‘never before in the history of hu-
man conflict has more money been spent 
by more people with less to show for it’” 
(Drake, 1973; 1)
3.  Self-fulfilling prophecies
Building large road systems changes the 
nature of the city into a more automobile-
dependent one.  In general, modelling has 
assumed that land use is “handed down” 
by land use planners and that transport 
planners are merely shaping the appropri-
ate transport system to meet the needs 
of the land use forecast.  This is not the 
case.  One of the major reasons why free-
ways around the world have failed to cope 
with demand is that transport infrastruc-
ture has a profound feedback effect on 
land use, encouraging and promoting new 
development wherever the best facilities 
are provided (or are planned). Most of the 
major US cities such as Chicago, New York 
and Detroit, which built extensive freeway 
systems as proposed by their grand trans-
portation studies, found that the freeways 
spread land use and generated more and 
more traffic until very soon after com-
pletion the freeways were already badly 
congested. Sometimes this happened at 
opening because urban sprawl had inten-
sified to such an extent during the plan-
ning and construction phase that the road 
facilities were already out-of-date. Many 
studies now refer to these issues under 
the rubric of “induced demand” (Goodwin, 
1997; Zeibots, 2007; Siegel, 2007) and 
the USEPA now requires that environmen-
tal assessments of the transport emissions 
impacts of new highways and freeways 
formally take into account that more ve-
hicle miles of travel (VMT) are generated 
by these projects than the traffic models 
typically predict (Newman and Kenworthy, 
1999).
Once locked into a primarily road-based 
system a momentum develops which is 
very hard to stop. The response to the fail-
ure of freeways to cope with traffic con-
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gestion is to suggest that still further roads 
are urgently needed. The new roads are 
then justified again on technical grounds 
in terms of time, fuel and other perceived 
savings to the community from eliminat-
ing the congestion. This sets in motion a 
vicious circle or self-fulfilling prophecy of 
congestion, road building, sprawl, conges-
tion and more road building. This is not 
only favourable to the vested interests of 
the road lobby and some land developers, 
but it also builds large and powerful gov-
ernment road bureaucracies whose pro-
fessional actors see their future as contin-
gent upon being able to justify large sums 
of money for road building. This commit-
ment often translates into direct political 
activity where policy makers and politi-
cians are influenced by what is narrow or 
biased technical advice. In this way road 
authorities can become de facto planning 
agencies directly shaping land use in a city 
and having a large vested interest in road-
based solutions to the transport problem.
4.  The European experience
In the post-war period European cities be-
gan to increase in automobile ownership 
and use. The pace of change and impact on 
the old cities became particularly evident 
during the 1960’s as the transport plan-
ning and traffic engineering professions 
in conjunction with decision-makers set 
about attempting to cater for this growth 
in automobiles by expanding existing road 
capacities, building new radial roads into 
the city centre and increasing parking fa-
cilities to cope with the influx of vehicles. 
Transport planning solutions were clearly 
being strongly influenced by the mathe-
matically modelled results of the time. The 
typical 20-year graphs showed increasing 
income and wealth, growing car ownership 
and use, declining public transport, walk-
ing and bicycling, projections of large road 
and parking capacity increases to prevent 
the cities drowning in traffic and a sub-
stantial mobilisation of public funds into 
road infrastructure. 
Transport planners used their land use-
transport planning models and overtly ob-
jective forecasting techniques to show an 
inevitable trend of accelerating motorisa-
tion and how to cope with it. But what hap-
pened? To some extent they were right, 
their analyses were partly vindicated and 
the patterns of change towards more au-
tomobile orientated growth are particular-
ly evident in data from 1960 to 1980 (see 
Kenworthy, 1990; Newman and Kenwor-
thy, 1989). However, the full implications 
of their prescriptions for cities, particularly 
in continental Europe, were soon found to 
be unacceptable. The rich fabric and ar-
chitectural history of the cities started to 
be threatened by destructive road plans. 
By the end of the 1960’s many city cen-
tres were drowning in traffic, inner city 
residential qualities were being eroded, air 
pollution and noise were becoming insuf-
ferable in the tightly packed urban layouts 
and a political momentum was developing 
to do something about “the traffic”.
What happened, particularly in West Ger-
many around the late 1960’s, was a deter-
mination not to allow further deterioration 
in the quality of cities and to peg back the 
motorisation trend through a commitment 
to public transport and pedestrianisation. 
This was the period when German cit-
ies began to plan and build their U-Bahn 
and S-Bahn systems and create networks 
of pedestrian streets with festive market 
places and human scale city spaces. In 
Munich the process was accelerated by 
the 1972 Olympic Games. It involved a 
large injection of Federal money into rapid 
transit and a curtailment of road expen-
ditures (Hall and Hass-Klau, 1985). Had 
they been fully implemented, the formu-
lations of conventional transport planning, 
being based more on following established 
trends than creating new ones, would 
probably have seen European cities follow 
a similar, but not so extreme pattern, as 
that of the US and Australian cities due to 
land constraints.
However, quite widespread popular rejec-
tion of this option in favour of protection 
and regeneration of the cities into people-
orientated places, and strong political and 
financial support for public transport saw 
the continental European cities at least 
partially break the self-fulfilling prophecy 
of more and more road building and in-
tense automobile dependence. Cities in 
Britain followed the road-based solutions 
to a greater extent, as evidenced for ex-
ample by the removal of the tram systems 
in all UK cities except Blackpool and the 
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relative scarcity of new urban rail sys-
tems since then (Barry, 1991). It is only 
comparatively recently that new systems 
have been planned and implemented (e.g. 
light rail systems in Manchester, Sheffield, 
Birmingham, Bristol and Edinburgh - see 
Simpson, 1989).
The solution to the problem continental 
European cities were facing did not come 
out of relying on the guidance of technical 
transport planning methodologies. It came 
out of a political process involving a sense 
of vision which had to be fought as hard 
as anywhere in the world, and it had to 
go largely against the mechanistically de-
termined view of the future as prescribed 
by conventional transport planning. Mon-
heim (1988) relates, for example, the dif-
ficulties faced by those wishing to close off 
streets in the centre of Nürnberg to cre-
ate a pedestrian network. The transport 
planners claimed that it could not be done 
because of the traffic volumes using the 
streets. However, it was done and their 
worst fears did not eventuate because 
between 71% and 80% of the traffic sim-
ply dissolved in each of the four stages as 
the pedestrianisation progressed between 
1972 and 1988 (Museumbrucke and Fleis-
chbrucke – 1972/3; Karolinenstrasse and 
Kaiserstrasse 1972/3; Bankgasse and Al-
derstrasse - 1982; Rathausplatz – 1988: 
personal communication Rolf Monheim). 
Nürnberg now has one of the world’s most 
beautiful central cities and an underground 
railway to service it.
This process which many European cen-
tres went through of deciding between a 
mechanistically determined future for their 
cities and one which involved a strong de-
gree of self-determination is neatly sum-
marised by Herman Daly. In referring to 
the self-fulfilling nature of many energy 
consumption predictions, he also effec-
tively sums up the basic choices involved 
in setting a city’s transport agenda:
“We can make a collective social decision 
regarding energy use and attempt to plan 
or shape the future under the guidance of 
moral will; or we can treat it as a prob-
lem in predicting other peoples’ aggregate 
behaviour and seek to outguess a mecha-
nistically determined future. As the art of 
foretelling the future has shifted from the 
prophet to the statistician, the visionary, 
goal oriented element and the accompa-
nying moral exhortation have atrophied, 
while the analytical, number crunching 
has hypertrophied. (Daly, 1978)
Evidence of the battle fought in Europe be-
tween these two different approaches to 
transport planning is partly seen in com-
ments by the Mayor of München and the 
Mayor of Vienna.
“With every million we spend on roads 
we will be closer to murdering our 
city.” Mayor of München (1975)
“…unlimited individual mobility … is 
an illusion … the future belongs to the 
means of public transportation” (and 
this will be) a driving force of city re-
newal”. Mayor of Vienna (Gratz, 1981)
5.  The failure of model-based trans-
port planning
High level failures
In the broad sweep of cities around the 
world, conventional transport planning 
practices and wisdom cannot claim to have 
left behind a proud legacy. Nowhere is 
this more evident than in the traffic chaos 
characteristic of many US cities such as 
Atlanta, Houston and Los Angeles. A simi-
lar situation is evident in Australia though 
it hasn’t reached the proportions found in 
the US. After decades of following the ad-
vice of practitioners using transport-land 
use models as one of their basic modus 
operandi, cities have been left with few 
apparent solutions to their traffic problems 
and in many cases few options other than 
to endure the traffic chaos on the roads or 
provide token gestures such as HOV lanes. 
This problem which escalated in the US in 
the 1980s was seen partly in the multi-
plication of articles and books at the time 
about congestion, with titles like: Metro-
politan Congestion: Towards a Tolerable 
Accommodation (Larson, 1988); Resolv-
ing Gridlock in Southern California (Poole, 
1988); “Managing” Suburban Traffic Con-
gestion: A Strategy for Suburban Mobility 
(Orski, 1987). Other articles and books on 
the subject abounded during this period 
(e.g., Cervero, 1986; Pratsch, 1986; Cer-
vero, 1984; Gleick, 1988).
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The overwhelming impression is of cities 
that can only hope to throw palliatives at 
a problem that has much deeper causes. 
Policies that are frequently suggested such 
as extended or early work hours, carpools 
and van pools, computerised traffic lights 
or discounts on transit are hardly go-
ing to alleviate or significantly arrest the 
problem. Technological wizardry was also 
sought through the Intelligent Highway 
System launched in the US in 1995, rep-
resenting a conglomeration of traditional 
highway lobby interests and the IT indus-
try to create a system that would essen-
tially micro-manage traffic flows on the 
road system during peak hours in order 
to provide a better relationship between 
supply and demand (http://www.sti.
nasa.gov/tto/spinoff1996/36.html). This 
programme involves research into what 
causes congestion on a micro-level so that 
drivers can relate to the street system in 
a totally interactive way, being told which 
routes to take to avoid snares, when to 
enter freeways from ramps to get the best 
run and at what speed to travel (Gleick, 
1988). One of the key ideas is that some-
how, if congestion is understood in a more 
detailed way, roads and people can be ma-
nipulated through electronic surveillance 
to keep traffic flowing. It is also some-
times suggested that California, for exam-
ple, should double-deck all its freeways, 
but perhaps as ‘tollways’, to encourage 
those who can afford it to pay the correct 
economic price for the privilege of moving 
around the freeway system at peak hour 
(Gleick, 1988; Poole, 1988).
The disturbing part about all these ap-
proaches is that they are seeking to treat 
only the symptoms of an ailing transport 
system, albeit in ever more technically so-
phisticated ways. This overlooks the root 
causes of the problems, which lie largely 
in inefficient land use patterns and trans-
port policies that prioritise road capacity 
increases over serious transport demand 
management (TDM), including proper road 
pricing (Whitelegg, 2011) and provision of 
higher quality public transport, cycling and 
walking infrastructure. The process of de-
veloping these technological solutions can 
create an unreal expectation that technol-
ogy alone will solve the problems of the 
city.
A small digression into the issue of new 
technologies and fuels for propulsion sys-
tems demonstrates this point further. 
Many still believe that alternative fuels 
and new types of cars will be the pana-
cea to the problem of “peak oil”, which will 
see the world’s supply of conventional oil 
become increasingly problematic and ex-
pensive (Campbell and Laherrere, 1995). 
To realise how persistent such thinking can 
be, one only has to consider the current 
hype over electro-mobility in Europe which 
seems intent on replacing 1 km of petrol/
diesel driving with 1 km of electrically 
powered driving, as though there are not 
already very good social, economic and 
environmental reasons for fundamentally 
reducing car use (Kenworthy, 2011).
 
Obviously, technological innovation is a 
crucial element in progress and problem 
solving and will always be sought, but there 
is a constant need to weigh such innova-
tion against other issues and a more holis-
tic vision of a future society. In the case of 
transport energy, the reality is that large-
scale fuel production from biomass, coal 
and oil shale has overwhelming econom-
ic and environmental, as well as climatic 
and human adaptation problems, which 
makes widespread use of these alterna-
tive fossil fuels for transport very unlikely.1 
New automobiles such as electric cars, al-
though dramatically improved technologi-
cally from years ago and increasingly pi-
loted in cities today, are still decades away 
from widespread market penetration, due 
mainly to the intense capital investment 
requirements in changing an entire auto-
mobile industry, fuel production and dis-
tribution system and technical support 
network over to electricity. The frenzied 
search for alternative fuels in the 70’s and 
early 80’s after the first two oil crises in 
1973 and 1979 and the on-going manifes-
tation of this technological ‘silver bullet’ 
approach in electro-mobility today, delay 
the search for deeper transport and plan-
ning solutions, which will produce a better 
overall quality of life in cities.
The above analogy in the field of transport 
energy should not be lost for its relevance 
to the central argument of this paper. 
Transport planning as a whole seems slow 
to respond to the new imperatives in cit-
ies and the failures of the past. There is a 
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tendency to hang onto entrenched beliefs, 
which have been shown to be false. For 
example, roads are still partly justified on 
the basis of simple cost-benefit analyses 
involving savings in fuel, time and some-
times emissions, time being the key item, 
which usually constitutes 70% to 80% 
of all monetized economic benefits. This 
occurs notwithstanding the widely docu-
mented Marchetti Constant of a 65 to 70 
minute overall travel time budget in cit-
ies through the millennia regardless of the 
dominant transport mode and showing 
that time savings due to speed increases 
in fact do not occur, but are rather just 
used to travel further (Marchetti, 1994; 
Newman and Kenworthy, 2006). 
It is very clear that from an urban sys-
tems perspective the analyses are wrong 
and that fuel, time and emissions are re-
ally costs of new urban road projects in 
cities particularly in those already highly 
dependent on cars (Newman and Kenwor-
thy, 1984 and 1988; Newman, Kenwor-
thy and Lyons, 1989). The fact that major 
new roads are sometimes still touted as 
solutions to congestion seems to suggest 
something of an inability to learn from 
past events. Almost fifty years of expe-
rience has demonstrated the futility of 
building more extensive road systems to 
relieve congestion and the environmental 
implications for the city of that approach 
are dramatic and widespread. For exam-
ple, the push for radical solutions to trans-
port problems in Los Angeles in the 1980s 
came from government environmental or-
ganisations faced with some of the world’s 
worst air pollution which was estimated 
to cost the community at that time some 
$US9.4 billion per year (The West Austral-
ian September 20, 1989 p80/1). 
And yet the ‘roading’ approach still per-
sists. Bremen, a city in northern Germany 
renowned for its progress in car sharing 
and non-motorised mode use, still strug-
gles with the issue of a major bypass (see 
WTPP 18.1/18.2 editorial), as does Aber-
deen in Scotland with its extremely expen-
sive Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route. 
Lancaster’s Northern Bypass, which cost 
£130 million for 4.5kms or £29 million per 
kilometer, is another recent example of ex-
cursions into this less than fruitful, indeed 
destructive transport strategy approach. 
Recent UK government pronouncements 
also herald a continuation of a “predict 
and provide” approach, with a staggering 
estimate of between 34% to 55% more 
vehicle miles of travel in England between 
2010 and 2035 and rejection of the “peak 
car use” hypothesis (Local Transport To-
day 592: http://www.transportxtra.
com/magazines/local_transport_today/
news/?iid=467, accessed April 11, 2012).
As if all of the foregoing evidence were not 
sufficient evidence of the inability of free-
ways to really provide solutions to traffic 
problems, we have further evidence of a 
reverse process of pulling freeways down 
being highly successful in actually reduc-
ing traffic. This evidence supports one of 
the key high-level as well as the technical 
failures of transport planning and mode-
ling: the failure to recognise traffic as be-
having fundamentally like a gas and not a 
liquid. 
Bringing together various sources, there 
are innumerable historical and more re-
cent examples of ‘trip-degeneration’, as 
it was termed by the late John Roberts 
(TEST, 1992):
• By 1998 there were already at least sixty 
documented cases worldwide where roads 
were closed or traffic capacity was reduced 
and 20% to 60% of traffic disappeared.
• Tower Bridge, London closed in 1994 due 
to structural problems: after 3 years traffic 
was still not back to original levels.
• Part of London’s ring road, the Ring of 
Steel was closed in 1993: Traffic fell by 
40%.
• London’s Hammersmith Bridge (30,000 
vehicles per day) was closed to all traf-
fic except buses and cyclists due to struc-
tural problems. A survey of commuters 
a few days before closure and the same 
people after showed 21% no longer drove 
to work. They switched to transit, walking 
and cycling and congestion in surrounding 
areas did not markedly increase.
• West Side Highway, New York City: 
1973 one section collapsed and most of 
the route was closed. A 1976 study of the 
remaining portion based on traffic counts 
three years prior to closure and two years 
after showed 53% of trips disappeared 
and of those trips, 93% did not reappear 
elsewhere.
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• In 1989 an Earthquake destroyed the 
Embarcadero Freeway in San Francisco 
and it was not rebuilt and the predicted 
chaos never materialised. The whole wa-
terfront area of San Francisco was revital-
ised.
• In 1996 San Francisco’s Central Freeway 
upper deck was torn down due to instabil-
ity following earthquake damage and traf-
fic chaos did not materialise.
• Melbourne, Swanston Street Transit 
Mall: Street carrying 30,000 vehicles per 
day closed to regular traffic. Traffic chaos 
in surrounding streets was vehemently 
projected during the lead up period. After 
closure there was no chaos. Some increas-
es in volumes were found on surrounding 
streets, but it was well within the capacity 
of the street to handle it.
• Portland: Harbor Drive Freeway along 
the Willamette River waterfront was closed 
in 1974 and then removed and a linear 
was park created (Tom McCall Waterfront 
Park). Traffic chaos did mot materialise, 
but the whole downtown was revitalised 
with LRT, people places and markets and 
sound urban design for pedestrians and 
transit users.
• Seoul, South Korea: The Cheonggye ele-
vated expressway of 6 km in length running 
through central Seoul was torn down be-
tween 2003 and 2005, along with Cheong-
gye Road beneath it, together carrying 
168,000 vehicles per day, and no traffic 
chaos ensued. In fact the traffic engineer 
interviewed in the documentary film made 
about the project reveals that the overall 
average traffic speed in the City of Seoul 
actually rose by 1.2 km/h, contrary to the 
more normal expectation of gridlock. This 
project has led to a more general “road 
diet” approach in Seoul, emphasising new 
bus lanes, improved subway operations 
and more walkable environments. The city 
is being greened (Schiller et al, 2010).
(Sources: Surface Transportation Policy 
Project, March 1998 issue of Progress; 
Seattle Urban Mobility Plan: Case Stud-




freeway%20removal.pdf, accessed April 




These projects are on top of the almost 
fifty years of successful pedestrianisation 
schemes in European cities such as Mu-
nich, Copenhagen, Köln and so on, which 
have also showed that significant amounts 
of traffic simply disappear following road 
closures and the cities become more liv-
able and sustainable (e.g. see earlier ex-
ample from Nürnberg).
The extent to which transport planning 
has lost its way since the Second World 
War and still so often fails to provide de-
cision-makers with the answers to urban 
transport problems, is partly seen in the 
following statement from the late 1980s 
reviewing Transportation Planning in a 
Changing World (Nijkamp and Reichman, 
1987). Excerpts from the review read as 
follows:
“This book clearly illustrates the con-
fused and contradictory world of trans-
portation planning. It is a collection of 
papers from a series of three inter-
national workshops on transportation 
sponsored by the European Science 
Foundation, and has no solid context 
or clear message that could be utilised 
to improve the world of transporta-
tion planning…the book fails to get to 
grips with the enormous failures of 
technical and model-based transpor-
tation planning ideology and is very 
thin on societal and cultural impacts… 
There is no clear discussion of the … 
multiple implications of increasingly 
higher levels of motorisation. Walk-
ing and cycling and road safety and 
urban design do not figure in this vol-
ume, and these are major issues of 
importance to transportation policy in 
the age of car dominance…The book 
is part of the problem it would claim 
to be examining…contributing to the 
mass of ‘received wisdom’ which de-
lays innovation, social awareness and 
genuinely critical transportation policy 
analysis.” (Whitelegg, 1988)
There is a sense that a significant part of 
the malaise into which transport planning 
has fallen is a preoccupation with the nar-
row cost-benefit analyses for new roads, 
which form the ‘punch line’ of the detailed 
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technical and mathematical modelling ap-
proaches. Such approaches go deeper into 
the microscopic aspects of, for example, 
travel behaviour or modal choice, without 
much of an appreciation for their broader 
context or how the work can be effectively 
applied to produce tangibly better cities 
for people. There is a danger that a lot of 
transport planning modelling and predic-
tions of the future are done without much 
of a feeling for what might be called the 
“soul” of the city and what will need to be 
done in practical terms if it is to become 
a better place to live. It seems that there 
is little point in becoming increasingly in-
volved with “tools” and “means” if there is 
no clear direction or leadership from with-
in the discipline as a whole about how the 
transport planner should really be trying 
to contribute to the betterment of the city.
Edmund Bacon, the famous American ur-
ban planner and architect from Philadelphia 
and outspoken critic of automobile-based 
planning, provides a useful comment on 
the consequences of overzealous and nar-
row economic number crunching in the 
formulation of urban transport policies:
“The sad thing is how often the plan-
ners in the United States seize mind-
lessly upon the latest fashionable 
planning gimmick. The cost-benefit 
ratio was one of the first of these, 
a” scientific” method for determin-
ing where a highway should be placed 
by adding up the costs of alternative 
highway routes and comparing these 
with a quantification of the value 
in dollars of the time saved by the 
highway user. This was adopted uni-
versally as the only right way to do 
things until its continued use imposed 
such outrageous consequences that it 
dawned on someone that saving the 
highway users a few seconds of time 
would be less socially and economical-
ly desirable than destroying irreplace-
able landscapes, historical sections 
of cities, coherent neighbourhoods, 
or networks of human relationships. 
Underlying it all was the failure to re-
alize that the development of policy 
through the manipulation of numbers 
is always bound to be wrong because 
numbers by definition leave out the 
unquantifiable variables: Human pas-
sions, beloved traditions, human will, 
and it is these which are really impor-
tant. While cost-benefit analysis and 
its many successors have been dis-
credited, basic understanding of the 
destructive effects of relying primarily 
on numbers in the formation of pub-
lic policy still has not penetrated the 
consciousness of the planning profes-
sion in the United States, and that 
profession is gradually committing 
suicide in consequence, persisting in 
the delusion that it is a science which 
it never was and never can be” (Ba-
con, 1988; 2)
This tendency to see transportation some-
what in isolation from the broader prob-
lems and issues in the city and a general 
lack of vision, leads to a growing isolation 
between transport planners and decision 
makers. From the technical viewpoint 
it is safer for many to stay more or less 
within the framework and methods de-
veloped within the period of the “grand 
plans”, which basically view increasing 
motorisation as almost inevitable and the 
‘rightness’ of more roads as a God-given 
truth, than to provide policy direction and 
vision–a contribution which might help cit-
ies find a way of breaking the automobile 
planning treadmill.
Technical failures
Even when judged on the basis of whether 
the technical procedures are producing ac-
curate predictions of, for example, future 
traffic flows and relationships between 
public and private transport, the over-
whelming weight of evidence has been on 
the negative side (Atkins, 1986). It is one 
thing for a transport-land use model to ac-
curately reproduce the present situation. 
It is quite another for it to accurately re-
flect what may happen in the future under 
a complex array of urban pressures and 
forces, or what the result might be where 
a city is given a glimpse of a future quite 
different to what exists today. There is a 
danger that the modelling process is so 
shaped by existing patterns that it is un-
able to respond correctly or creatively to 
significantly different circumstances (e.g. 
markedly higher localised TOD densities) 
or to meaningfully incorporate significant 
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factors outside its usual outlook (complex 
climate change, social changes or qualita-
tive changes in the city environment that 
demand new approaches). Conventional 
transport modelling is simply too geared 
to extrapolating and magnifying existing 
patterns to be of significant use in guiding 
cities towards an alternative future. The 
future being demanded today in all cities is 
for a low carbon, regenerative approach to 
the urban environment, which at the same 
time delivers a high quality of life.
In particular, the techniques of transport 
planning are not well-suited to predicting 
human responses to qualitative changes in 
the character of a city or the way people 
may respond to a new transport option. 
The models may suggest little if any re-
sponse and yet the changes may be quite 
rapid and marked. For example, a city may 
make a major effort to humanise its cen-
tral city through urban design improve-
ments, city art and festive market places, 
pedestrianisation schemes, and other traf-
fic limitation strategies. At the same time 
it may decide to install or upgrade rail 
services with the result that people may 
discover new ways of experiencing their 
city. This can begin to set new relation-
ships between transport and land use in-
cluding reductions in parking, greater de-
mand for central and inner city housing, 
joint development of high density, mixed 
use TOD complexes around stations, bet-
ter pedestrian and bicycle links and facili-
ties and still more public transport. Travel 
behaviour and housing options can change 
quite rapidly under these circumstances, 
in ways that transport modelling does not 
anticipate or incorporate well. Certainly, it 
would be most unlikely that a convention-
al transport planning study would recom-
mend that such changes be made to a city.
To a great extent all the changes just men-
tioned have happened in Portland, Oregon 
over the last 25 to 30 years, at least in 
the central and inner city areas. Twenty to 
thirty years is a rather typical time horizon 
for a transport planning study. Portland’s 
transportation plans of the 1970s were for 
more freeways, which would have added 
more traffic pressure to downtown Port-
land and made it a less hospitable place. 
Transport patterns would have been a con-
tinuation of existing trends rather than a 
significant break in them. Instead Port-
landers built a new light rail line (MAX, 
opened in 1986) in place of a freeway and 
embraced it and their revitalised central 
city in a way that was not predicted by 
any transport studies. The story of how 
this change occurred so that conventional 
transport plans were rejected and a new 
vision enacted is a valuable case study 
(Edner and Arrington, 1985).
Other cities too have shown surprisingly 
rapid land use adaptation and success 
with their new rail systems. For example, 
Washington DC and in particular some Ca-
nadian cities such as Vancouver have nu-
merous examples of integration between 
new rail systems and high density, mixed 
use development (Newman and Kenwor-
thy, 1999; Schiller et al, 2010). Los An-
geles’ rail development was linked in its 
planning phases to proposed major new 
commercial and mixed-use developments 
(Keefer, 1986) and this has occurred both 
around its new Metro stations on the Red 
and Purple lines (e.g. at Wilshire/Vermont 
and Hollywood and Vine) and around the 
light rail system (e.g. at Del Mar station on 
the Gold line).
The retreat into ever-increasing sophisti-
cation and microscopic detail in the tech-
niques of transport planning without a 
clear vision, aim or goal, seems to lead 
to an increasingly deadened sense of pur-
pose within the profession and an inability 
to provide policy makers with sound guid-
ance. Decision-makers, who must cope 
with an increasingly complex set of de-
mands related to local, regional, national 
and global sustainability needs, provision 
of more diverse housing options, social 
and community needs and depressed fi-
nancial situations, often find many of the 
prescriptions from traditional transport 
analyses blinkered and unworkable.
In summary, the technical world of trans-
port planning finds it difficult to get be-
yond a view that the city’s future can be 
predicted and provided for by mathemati-
cal equations based on often-debatable 
transport economic and behavioural the-
ories. Relative transport costs, resource 
efficiency measures, narrow cost-benefit 
analyses and other abstractions from the 
world of transport modelling are not of 
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themselves adequate to the task of guid-
ing decision making and fulfilling diverse 
community expectations about the future 
of a city and its quality of life. Without a 
wider social and environmental as well as 
broader economic context, transport plan-
ning often loses sight of other important 
forces and is always at risk of working in 
a vacuum, producing answers that are of 
little or no use to politicians, the commu-
nity and business leaders, or the long term 
sustainability and liveability of cities.
6.  Planning with vision
It is very rare to find a transport planning 
treatise which makes a clear statement 
about the broader intent of the work, a 
statement which sets a clear human con-
text or vision and gives the mathematical 
and modelling work substance, direction 
and meaning. Transport and Reurbanisa-
tion (Klaassen et al, 1981), historically 
was one of the first works to break this 
mould. While clearly translating its trans-
port prescriptions for cities into mathemat-
ical modelling terms, transport was clearly 
directed towards encouraging a process 
of  “reurbanisation” which the authors saw 
as crucial to the total life and meaning of 
the city. They make a very clear statement 
early in the work that sets a human con-
text for their transport planning expertise 
and makes the book readable and mean-
ingful.
They describe ‘reurbanisation’, their ulti-
mate goal, in the following way:
“The process thus set going is one of 
once more turning degenerated urban 
patches into city quarters with living 
cores, fulfilling a real economic, social 
and cultural function, a process of re-
urbanisation. Its ultimate fascinating 
objective is the revival of the old core 
cities, fascinating to many individuals 
who have learnt in hard practice that 
living near to nature means mowing 
the lawn every week, driving down-
town in long queues every morn-
ing and driving out of town in long 
queues in the evening; that a subur-
ban home means buying a second car 
for their wives so that they may flee 
the periphery, etc. The more people 
realise all this, the less they will want 
to leave the inner city if they are still 
there, and the stronger will become 
the desire to live just there, leading 
a modern life in an old town full of 
atmosphere”(p. 36).
With the benefit of hindsight, reurbanisa-
tion is in fact what many cities have been 
embracing since that time. In the case of 
Australian cities, this started as “urban 
consolidation”, the US cities have their 
“smart growth” programmes and count-
less European cities have been and still are 
regenerating former industrial and port 
areas into vibrant new communities (e.g. 
Hafen City, Hamburg to name just one).
Experience in Perth, Western Australia
Perth’s urban history strengthens the view 
that the seemingly objective and techni-
cally “correct” or safe view from the world 
of transport planning fails to respond to 
the realities and needs of the changing 
city. For years Perth had numerous trans-
port studies, performed using methods 
and techniques respectable in the best of 
transport planning circles. They all pre-
dicted growing car orientation, declining 
public transport and a need for bigger and 
better roads. And this is what was experi-
enced, certainly until the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s.
During the late 1970’s and into the 80’s, 
there was a sense in some quarters that 
the city was being cast along a path of self-
fulfilling prophecies. The old diesel subur-
ban rail lines were being systematically re-
moved or run down (the 19 km Fremantle 
line, one of only three suburban rail lines, 
was closed to secure land for a freeway) 
and new land for more freeways was being 
reserved on increasingly tenuous grounds 
for roads with no known date of construc-
tion exposing government to enormous 
claims for injurious affection and result-
ing in the Road Reserves Review (Govern-
ment of Western Australia, 1991). Led by 
a civil society action group called “Friends 
of The Railways” established in early 1979 
to oppose the Fremantle rail line closure, 
a change in political direction provided a 
window of opportunity to redress Perth’s 
lopsided transport planning and this be-
gan a fundamental and far-reaching mo-
mentum in favour of public transport and 
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more compact urban development pat-
terns, which could help reshape the car 
dependent urban environment. A peti-
tion with 110,000 signatures against the 
Fremantle line closure was presented to 
the State Parliament in 1979, at a time 
when the population of Perth was about 
860,000. Real pressures for such changes 
had been creeping up continually through 
the 1970’s, however it wasn’t until the 
mid-80’s that a real consensus started to 
develop at the political level that some-
thing needed to be done to balance Perth’s 
urban sprawl and road orientation.
Little help was provided from the urban 
transport planning fraternity who contin-
ued to provide road-oriented solutions and 
unimaginative public transport studies, 
which invariably favoured busways over 
railways. At the political level, amongst 
some legacy-driven politicians, a vision 
began to develop of the way the city need-
ed to change and how this might occur. 
This constituted a realisation that the only 
way the city was going to generate inno-
vative initiatives was to seriously question 
the car and bus-based solutions. This re-
quired embracing ideas from community, 
academic and professional sources whose 
experience and perspective outside tradi-
tional transport planning suggested that 
other directions were possible (Newman, 
2011). 
 
After the reintroduction of the old Freman-
tle diesel rail service in 1983 and during 
the subsequent electrification of the whole 
rail system from 1988 to 1991, achieve-
ments that involved the community and 
politicians being forced to lead their trans-
port professionals into a more balanced 
and visionary approach, the next focus 
was on the sprawling northern suburbs. 
The northern corridor has taken a huge 
share of Perth’s urban growth over many 
decades, based firmly on the automobile 
and low-density suburbs. A freeway was 
provided in the centre of the corridor, but 
after great popularity in the beginning, it 
rapidly became congested causing many 
people in the late 1980s to demand better 
transport options for the corridor, the most 
popular of which was a rail line (Newman, 
1992).
A rapid transit study was conducted in the 
1980s which concluded that an O-Bahn 
busway or a train service could be intro-
duced in the middle of the freeway - an 
option made possible at the insistence of 
a former Labor Premier of WA in the ear-
ly 1970s, not by transport planners who, 
on the contrary, had in previous decades 
removed two rail reserves from the met-
ropolitan planning scheme. The transport 
consultants involved the community in 
the assessment of the options and a clear 
preference for rail was given. The consult-
ants however concluded, with encourage-
ment from Perth’s transport planners, that 
a busway was preferred on cost grounds. 
A further study was done which evaluat-
ed this report and brought in more of the 
land use options created by rail, which a 
busway does not provide (as well as high-
lighting a technical issue about where all 
the buses entering the central city from 
the busway would actually end up). This 
new report preferred rail and showed it to 
be a viable economic option, so a govern-
ment decision was made to build the first 
major extension of a suburban rail system 
in modern Australian history (Newman, 
1992). 
A $400m commitment to electrifying the 
three old rail lines and building a new line 
to the northern suburbs, was the biggest 
single capital investment by the State Aus-
tralian Labor Party government in its term 
of office during that time. The popular-
ity of the decision and the shifts in think-
ing about land use since then (containing 
urban sprawl, focusing on development 
near rail stations etc), have confirmed the 
game-changing nature of this decision.
 
In order to maximise the potential of the 
connection between land use and rail serv-
ices in the way Toronto, Vancouver, Singa-
pore and other cities have done, it became 
necessary for Perth to gain experience in 
areas such as joint public-private devel-
opment and value capture around railway 
stations. These approaches have been 
common practice in many cities for some 
years, particularly those that have installed 
new rail systems (e.g. Los Angeles’ Spe-
cial Benefit Assessment Districts around 
rail stations). This shift to a rail orienta-
tion set a new context for public transport 
planning in Perth and offered the opportu-
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nity to better link land use planning to the 
public transport system in projects, such 
as Perth’s “Subi Centro” TOD at Subiaco 
railway station a few kilometres west of 
the CBD. This is something that would not 
have happened while road and bus plan-
ning predominated.
It has now become accepted that it is not 
sufficient for the Government to just build 
and operate a new rail system. Rather, 
much of the community, the development 
industry as well as the public transport op-
erator, acknowledge that they can all ben-
efit together by ensuring that the potential 
of the rail system to help reshape the city 
is fully realised. These new forces are now 
changing the nature of the city, incremen-
tally and in small, slow steps, away from 
more car dependence and dispersed land 
use, into a more focused and transit-ori-
ented city. 
Figure 1 shows the growth in total rail us-
age in Perth and Adelaide over the last 23 
years. In Perth, where improvements and 
extension of the system has occurred, us-
age has exploded six-fold from 1988 to 
2011. In Adelaide, which had a similar and 
comparable suburban diesel rail service 
to Perth in the 1980s (and still has, apart 
from an extension of its one tram line), 
but has experienced no politically or com-
munity-led rail revival until now, rail use 
has stagnated.
Experience in Portland, Oregon
Similar experiences occurred in Portland, 
Oregon through the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
The long fight in Portland away from the 
early technical transport studies and their 
overwhelming road orientation is summa-
rised by Edner and Arrington (1985) in the 
following way:
“…initial political stirrings for a transit 
option were substantially unsupport-
ed by comprehensive technical stud-
ies. The thrust was to wean Portland 
away from a highway-based system 
and buy time to develop a balanced 
alternative using transit and limited 
highway improvements.” (p. 14)
Figure 1. Perth and Adelaide rail use from 1988 to 2011.
Source: Constructed from public transport operator data from Perth and Adelaide
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This involved doing some new technical 
studies with an emphasis on transit, but 
this time under the auspices of Oregon’s 
Governor who was convinced that change 
was needed.
“The key question facing the Gover-
nor’s Task Force (GTF) was whether 
transit was a viable alternative to 
freeway investment. Sixty-eight sys-
tem configurations for the region were 
ultimately evaluated. These configu-
rations were identified as alternatives 
to PVMATS (Portland-Vancouver Met-
ropolitan Area Transportation Study) 
and its highway emphasis. That study, 
initiated in 1959 but not formally 
adopted until 1971, assumed that 
transit ridership and operation would 
stabilize and, at worst, continue a 
trend of decline into the future.” (p. 
14)
Like nearly every ‘grand plan’ from the 
1950’s, Portland’s transportation study 
was roads-orientated and virtually as-
sumed the demise of public transport. 
However, the GTF’s report provided the 
first technical justification for transit based 
on a range of factors including positive en-
vironmental effects, but more importantly 
according to Edner and Arrington:
“…it set the stage for developing the 
technical and political decision-mak-
ing capability for regional transit plan-
ning. The GTF report was a crucial el-
ement in the decision to withdraw the 
Mt Hood Freeway…This technical jus-
tification initiated a linked technical/
political decision-making process… 
Freeways were de-emphasized to the 
benefit of transit and a CBD focus.” 
(p. 15)
They summarise the decision to build a rail 
line instead of a freeway as:
“…a major shift in the functional and 
philosophic role of transit in the re-
gion… (which) …ruptured the political 
fabric of transportation decision-mak-
ing, realigning the roles and responsi-
bilities of many political and technical 
actors.” (p. 2)
In both Perth and Portland transport plan-
ning was really forced through a political 
process, especially involving the commu-
nity, to take on new directions. There was 
little evidence that the transport profes-
sion was about to provide the initiatives 
itself.
7.  Transport planning–the crucial link 
to land use
 
Ultimately the transport problem is a land 
use problem. Porter (1987) in discussing 
America’s rapid slide into national gridlock 
in the 1980s stated that:
“Most communities are trying to over-
come the traffic crisis in ways that 
actually perpetuate it. Most projects 
being planned and developed in fast 
growing areas build in automobile de-
pendency, which leads to congested 
arteries which results in cries to re-
duce densities of development, which 
in turn creates greater dependency on 
automobiles.” (p. 34)
Pucher (1988) described and compared 
the success of urban public transport sub-
sidies in the US in relation to other coun-
tries and found that in virtually no other 
country have subsidies been as ineffective 
as they have been in the US. His final con-
clusion makes the point that without:
“…policies to increase the cost of auto 
travel and to promote a more com-
pact land-use pattern, it seems un-
likely that any significant changes will 
be possible in the US urban transpor-
tation system.” (p. 402)
It would still appear today that if trans-
port planning is to provide any clear policy 
guidance to decision-makers confronted 
with how to respond to car dependency 
and congestion, the planners’ approach 
must incorporate some more radical vi-
sions of compact land use patterns both in 
developing areas and through selective in-
fill and redevelopment in older areas. The 
way technical transport studies are con-
ceived and the policies and prescriptions 
that result from them, can then be geared 
towards achieving those visions. Even if 
some of the solutions seem unachievable 
within prevailing social, economic and po-
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litical realities, the fact that an attempt 
has been made to provide an alternative 
vision is a forward step, which develops 
momentum.  In particular, it can begin to 
give substance to the idea that a better 
balance between cars and other modes is 
possible. Once started, this momentum 
can gradually filter its way through com-
munities, bureaucracies and the political 
arena and finally into concrete change, as 
has been the case in Portland and Perth.
  
It is interesting that in Portland the proc-
ess of planning and building MAX was 
characterised by a lot of cynicism particu-
larly in the press. A competition was run 
to find the best name for the system. A 
Street Car Named Expire finally won. MAX 
however is a big success, both as a trans-
port system and as a focal point for new 
development. Howard (1988) reported 
shortly after the opening of the first line 
in 1986, that benefit assessment districts 
established in downtown to return to the 
community some of the private land val-
ue increases of the system “ have proven 
very successful, partly because the sys-
tem is so appealing to the public that the 
development community is jumping on the 
bandwagon to expand the scope of that 
program” (p172). Having made the big 
break and built a railway instead of a free-
way, the next steps were easier. The only 
arguments in Portland about MAX became 
who should get the next extension.
Circumstances also change, which make 
what is achievable a constantly changing 
thing. For example, in Perth 27 years ago 
it would not have been conceivable that 
the city would now have electrified three 
existing rail lines, constructed a 33 km line 
to the north, a 71 km line to the south 
and be actively pursuing the develop-
ment of a LRT system and further heavy 
rail extensions and new lines. Nor would it 
have been thinkable that all these changes 
would also be allied to efforts at rail sta-
tions to provide a focus for land use devel-
opment. These changes did not come out 
of traditional transport planning analyses, 
but there is a chance that they could have, 
given the right issues, contexts and goals 
to shape the transport planning process.
8. Making transport planning a better 
tool in reshaping the auto-city
There is nothing inherent in the actual 
techniques of the land use-transport mod-
elling process or the other technical pro-
cedures of transport planning which will 
inevitably produce road-biased results.  It 
is more the way decisions are made about 
how to use the techniques. Historically 
road planners have dominated this ex-
ercise.  If a genuine attempt is made to 
consider alternatives to urban sprawl and 
more freeways, which is accompanied by 
a community engagement process, such 
as Perth’s Dialogue With The City (see 
Schiller et al, 2010), it is possible to give 
new directions to the transport planning 
process. It is also possible to build in more 
sophisticated feedback mechanisms where 
transport and land use are dealt with in an 
iterative manner, one progressively affect-
ing the other. This would in all likelihood 
be an improvement over existing practic-
es, though the results of such models are 
still subject to considerable debate and in-
consistency and are by no means guaran-
teed to come up with prescriptions, which 
will assist cities in transitioning to lower 
car dependence (Webster, Bly and Paulley, 
1988).
Ultimately it comes back to the first stage 
of the process - the formation of goals and 
objectives. In the past, and unfortunately 
still today in many places, land use-trans-
port modelling has chased something of a 
fairy-tale world where transport demand 
and supply are meant to be kept in equi-
librium by planning road systems to cope 
with projected traffic volumes–a sort of 
“transport utopia”. The pressing require-
ment was, and often still is, to try to keep 
ahead of congestion. Interestingly, even 
after decades of experience in US and UK 
cities of building freeways while conges-
tion relief remained an elusive goal, large 
new roads are still today called for and 
justified for their ability to relieve conges-
tion. Fundamentally, in too many places 
a genuine alternative, such as minimis-
ing unnecessary private motorised travel, 
has not really been embraced. Too often, 
walking and bicycling are not considered 
in any serious way, while public transport 
is often still seen as an addendum to the 
main game of catering for private mobility. 
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In many cases there is very little mean-
ingful variation in the different scenarios 
provided by transport studies – just minor 
variations on a fundamentally road-orient-
ed theme.
A change to more comprehensive planning 
requires better specification of the goals 
and objectives of transport studies and 
more emphasis on public transport in the 
models. Since the 1980s there has been 
a rapid growth in new light rail systems 
throughout the USA and Canada (com-
mencing in Edmonton in 1978 and then 
Calgary and San Diego in 1981). These 
new systems have been introduced largely 
as broader community or politically led ini-
tiatives in response to a dire need for mo-
bility alternatives, rather than as techni-
cal decisions from conventional transport 
analyses. This political and community-
driven response reflects widespread dis-
enchantment with the problems created 
by automobile dependence such as con-
gestion, local, regional and global environ-
mental impacts and social and economic 
inequity in transport. Rather than promot-
ing greater freedom, unbridled personal 
mobility derived from mass prosperity and 
automobile use, have created high levels 
of individual frustration where a car is the 
only alternative for most trips (Eno Foun-
dation, 1988). 
Urban and transport planners everywhere 
can assert their role in the development 
of cities through new goals and objec-
tives for transport-land use modelling 
based around balancing the roles of vari-
ous modes of transport, minimising total 
motorised travel in the urban system and 
reducing the costs of urban land develop-
ment through reducing urban sprawl – in 
short creating more sustainable and in-
deed regenerative cities. There is no com-
pulsive reason why transport planning 
should favour roads and suburban sprawl 
to the exclusion of other modes and more 
compact patterns of development.  As 
stated by the last major Australian urban 
“grand plan”, the Sydney Area Transporta-
tion Study (SATS, 1974) concerning land 
use-transport modelling:
“Some of the inputs into the models 
are based on assumptions of a politi-
cal nature or those containing value 
judgements… transportation models 
cannot directly give answers to policy 
questions, nor can they derive trans-
portation system alternatives.  Final 
decisions cannot be reduced to a set 
of mathematical equations.” (p II-1).
9.  Conclusion
 
The key to making transport planning a 
better contributor to policy development 
does not lie in giving what amounts to 
open-ended briefs, such as asking com-
puter-modelling studies to predict traffic 
20 years into the future and how many 
new roads are going to be necessary to 
cope with it. History shows that under this 
kind of direction it is almost assured that 
within the logic of the models’ own analy-
sis enough traffic will be foreseen to jus-
tify any number of new roads. This is how 
the grand transportation studies of the 
1950’s, 60’s and 70’s universally recom-
mended elaborate freeway networks and 
presided over a massive decline in urban 
public transport.
Even asking traffic models to assess 
whether traffic projections alone justify 
the construction now of a particular road, 
tends to take the decision out of context 
with other important values, visions and 
directions in the city, which are often in 
direct opposition to the idea of building 
more road capacity (e.g. the aforemen-
tioned conflict in Bremen between build-
ing a new ring road and all its sustainable 
transport achievements to date). The in-
ternal workings of traffic models tend to 
generate self-fulfilling prophecies of traffic 
and future road needs without considera-
tion of the broader implications. Such an 
approach is an invitation to perpetuate or 
strengthen dependence on the car and a 
sure way of generating a sense of power-
lessness within public planning about in-
fluencing the future land use and transport 
directions of any city.
What appears to be needed is a strong vi-
sion of what overall directions are most de-
sirable for the city and then, if necessary, 
to seek guidance from transport modelling 
about how to get there. Questions about 
the need for new roads should not be put 
in terms of “Is the new road justified on 
traffic grounds?” Based on historical ex-
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perience, traffic models are very likely to 
conclude that it is. Rather we should be 
asking questions such as:
 
• Is the new road in keeping with the vi-
sion of the future city and its sustainability 
and will building it contribute to or detract 
from this? 
• Is it desirable to see the projected traffic 
growth fulfilled or should planning policy 
actively seek to prevent or modify, rather 
than facilitate that growth?
• What are the alternative options for a 
city in assessing a road proposal and how 
do these alternatives relate to a range of 
other objectives (e.g. environmental pro-
tection, urban regeneration, reduced re-
source and energy consumption, livabil-
ity of neighbourhoods, accessibility for all 
groups in the community, transport safety 
etc)?
Collectively we need to be able to say 
what we would like the city to look like in 
20 years time:
• What sort of improvements in the urban 
environment do we want?
 
• What qualities and diversity do we want 
in urban lifestyles? (e.g. communal spaces 
where once only streets existed; mixed 
land uses as opposed to rigid zoning; more 
mixture in dwelling styles and density, 
greater sociability versus increased priva-
tism).
 
• What do we want the central city and 
sub-centres to look like?
 
• Do we want strong centres and what 
should the balance be in modes of access 
to and within these centres?
 
• What kind of overall population and job 
densities should the city aim for to mini-
mise car dependence and where should 
higher densities be concentrated? 
• What goals could be set in terms of re-
ducing car dependence? (e.g. parking lev-
els in the CBD and other centres, modal 
split for various types of trips including 
goals for walking and cycling and targets 
for reducing overall per capita car use).
 • What goals could be set for extending 
or introducing new rail systems to help re-
duce car dependence?
Working within this type of visionary 
framework, transport planning can make 
a constructive contribution to urban policy 
development. The last thing that is needed 
is self-fulfilling road prophecies from com-
puter models telling communities what the 
city will look like and what they are going 
to have to do to cope with such scenari-
os. In simple terms, “predict and provide” 
planning, which treats traffic as a kind of 
immutable liquid that will simply flow over 
everything if not catered for, needs to be 
replaced with a “debate and decide” ap-
proach which treats traffic as an expand-
able or compressible gas and allows cities 
to shape a regenerative future for them-
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